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ABSTRACT
A growing trend in satellite development includes shortening the development lifecycle for hardware and software,
cost reduction, and promoting reuse for future missions. Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition policies mandate
system providers use Open Systems Architecture (OSA) where feasible. Modular Open Network Architecture
(MONA) is a subset of OSA and paves the way to achieve cost reduction and reuse during a reduced development
lifecycle. MONA approaches provide opportunities to enhance data security handling, including multi-layered security approaches, data monitoring, and logging.
Traditional satellite architectures use non-networked point-to-point communication and rely on radio communication
security (COMSEC) for protection. This single layer of defense is an effective gatekeeper, providing perimeter security for any data transferred between the satellite and ground, especially if adapted to network data transfer protocols
which integrate with spacecraft data architecture. However, a satellite designed using MONA can provide more tools
for enhancing data security.
This paper explores the benefits of using a MONA approach for spacecraft, difficulties in implementing and securing
such an architecture, and discusses possibilities for addressing security concerns in a MONA satellite through a multilayer security framework. Ultimately, MONA provides a feasible path forward for realizing a modern security approach in satellite operations.
play Architecture.3,4,5,6 Reduced budgets and an increasingly competitive market are fueling this trend.

INTRODUCTION
Department of Defense (DoD) acquisition policy requires that system providers use Open System Architecture (OSA) where feasible.1 The transition of satellite architectures toward OSA provides significant opportunities for enhancing data security. Many options exist for
increasing space system security via OSA and several of
these options borrow from the systems and practices that
are already employed by terrestrial systems.

Modular Open Network Architecture (MONA), a term
coined by the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC),
is a subset of OSA that implies the architecture is designed natively for net-centric data transfer. MONA
paves the way for systems engineers to achieve the goal
of cost reduction and reuse in shorter timeframes.
MONA approaches are widely used in terrestrial applications because of improved interoperability, portability,
and reuse when implemented in a model similar to the
Open System Interface (OSI) model.7

The overarching goal of utilizing OSA is to reduce the
cost to develop, maintain, and update systems.2 This goal
is directly in line with the trend in satellite development
toward reduced cost and increased reusability while adhering to tighter development timelines. Examples of
this trend include Northrop Grumman’s Modular Space
Vehicle Bus (MSV), Space and Missile Systems Center’s Standard Network Adapter for Payloads, North
American Space Agency’s Core Flight Software System,
and Air Force Research Laboratory’s Space Plug-andShirley

This paper will discuss the benefits of shifting to an open
system architecture, the additional benefits of a modular
open network architecture, security benefits and challenges, and methods for implementing security within a
MONA spacecraft.
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The weakness of traditional architectures can be addressed by:12

THE SHIFT TO OSA
The space industry has largely depended on highly integrated spacecraft architectures to provide the sophisticated, high-performance systems needed for national and
commercial space missions. The desire for ever increasing performance with very low production volumes over
generations of space development programs has relied
on customized, often proprietary, methods more akin to
a craft or artisan process than the manufacturing processes of other industries. The maturity of manufacturing
processes, open system architecture, and an increased
understanding of how to apply approaches to low-volume production is spreading into the aerospace community.

1) Mandating open standards and protocols
2) Utilizing open interfaces to enable interoperability
3) Adhering to open interface specifications as system
components are designed
4) Adopting adaptable, upgradable, and reconfigurable
system architecture
5) Considering modular and open systems design benefits and concerns

The current era of space systems development is increasingly constrained by reduced budgets, design and development lifecycles, maintenance allowances, integration
and testing timelines, etc.; in an effort to address budget
constraints every aspect of space system design and development is condensed or reduced. The DoD is trying
to address these constraints by achieving greater spending efficiency and productivity while optimizing system
performance and reducing total ownership costs.8,2 The
DoD has recognized that closed, proprietary systems design is limiting competitiveness, is not as effective at fostering innovation, is less cost-effective or schedule-effective, does not ease integration, does not reduce cost of
ownership, and is generally reaching a point that it is unsustainable. Although the current process produces
highly capable systems that have been successful in producing space dominance for decades, they are achieved
at a high cost.9,10,11

6) Utilizing business strategies to gain access to competitive sources of supply and effectively manage
technological obsolescence

The desire of the customer base to reduce costs and increase benefits is providing the incentive needed to motivate a shift in business practices; however, there is still
much work to be done to transition to a new architecture
class.

MONA achieves all the benefits of OSA and operates
under a paradigm many developers are already used to,
the Internet.

This set of criteria can be boiled down to the need to increase competition, increase innovation, develop rapidly, reduce overall cost, increase reuse, increase interoperability, increase portability, and increase ease of integration. All of these needs can by addressed by using
open system architecture.
OSA Background
When utilized correctly, OSA facilitates reuse, interoperability, and portability. OSA facilitates increased competition, reduced life-cycle costs, increased innovation,
reduced schedule, faster and less costly repairs and upgrades, and enhanced interoperability as depicted in Figure 1.13

Ultimately, the adoption of OSA and MONA is spreading, and new advances in technology and systems engineering will help to expedite this process. MONA allows
systems engineers to integrate commercial off-the-shelf
(COTS) components with more ease, readily realize the
benefits of hardware and software interface standardization, and readily realize the benefits of layered architectures. All of these benefits of MONA enable reuse, new
technology integration, interoperability, portability, cost,
and schedule reduction. These benefits and their subsequent effects create a strong argument for the utilization
of MONA in space systems. However, MONA is not
without its drawbacks. The next section will introduce
the security benefits and challenges that come with having a space system made up of networked components.

Reducing development timelines and development costs
can help with secondary concerns as well. Parts and technology obsolescence can be attributed to long development times of the entire system, which can sometimes
take a decade; to individual component development
timelines; and to an inability to easily retrofit new components into existing programs.
As the customer base continues to move toward modular,
open architectures, they are discovering more advantages and showing stronger interest in overcoming
weaknesses in traditional architectures.
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data traffic within the network and respond is an important part of risk management that could be implemented in MONA spacecraft.

Increased
competition
Enhanced
interoperability

MONA spacecraft approaches also result in some challenges from a security perspective. Networked systems
enable data to flow easily from one part of the system to
another. One challenge is to ensure that the data flow is
intended, and not malicious. This challenge becomes
more significant in broader networks, such as a hosted
payload or networked satellite-to-satellite communications. Similar to computer systems linked by the internet,
ensuring that a compromise in one part of the network
does not propagate to other parts of the network is a security interest.

Reduced
life-cycle
cost
Open
systems
benefits

Faster and
less costly
repairs and
upgrades

Increased
innovation

Security Challenges

Reduced
schedule

The utilization of a MONA brings a set of challenges
similar to those seen on the Internet, which is itself conceptually a MONA system. These challenges can be categorized as:

Figure 1: Open System Benefits*
SECURITY WITHIN A MONA SPACECRAFT
Most satellites today use non-networked point-to-point
communication and rely on radio communications security (COMSEC) to protect the satellite. In this type of
implementation, the entire spacecraft bus and all communication inside the security perimeter created by the
encrypted radio system are trusted. A spacecraft incorporating MONA can have the same security perimeter,
but with additional challenges and benefits.
There are many options for addressing MONA security
and several borrow from the best practices employed by
terrestrial systems. An ideal system would implement
measures to protect space systems at the component level
while minimizing the cost to assess and authorize a space
vehicle.

1.

Access Control – Identify who is authorized to use
the resources on the network and who is not, so that
the system can respond appropriately

2.

Auditing – Monitoring the network to ensure only
those authorized to have access to certain resources
actually have access, and keeping those who should
not have access locked out

3.

Response – The network response to unauthorized
network communication

4.

Adaptability – The ability to upgrade as risks to security are identified and solutions are found

Access control has many implications and the upcoming
Security Principles section covers it in more depth. Figure 2 depicts a scenario that exemplifies the issues that
can be encountered without access control. The desired
communication traces are shown in green, while the undesired or unwanted communication traces are shown in
orange. This diagram illustrates the issues that arise
when there is no access control mechanism in place:
there is no way to discriminate between desired and undesired traffic. This example only shows traffic initiated
from external sources, but traffic initiated from internal
sources has the same problem.

Networked space systems can enable a paradigm shift toward the types of security policies and practices common
for terrestrial networks. Extending the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) Risk Management
framework (RMF) into the space vehicle would provide
higher levels of security and improved tools for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating the security. The
RMF process includes risk framing, risk assessment, risk
response, and risk monitoring.14 The ability to monitor

Auditing is critical to detecting attacks or abnormal behavior and troubleshooting problems. Figure 2 shows

*

Source: GAO analysis of DoD and industry data.
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that it is impossible in this system to identify who is communicating with whom, and this is especially true for internal only traffic. Even if measures are implemented to
control access, there is no current means to determine
how well the measures were working.

Security Principles
At a basic level, networked systems need to be protected
and network resources need access control through controlling traffic from external sources (Figure 3) and internal sources (Figure 4). Access control can get very
complicated and the examples do not illustrate all communication patterns or policies that could be applicable
for the example networks. The basic concept of access
control has many implications. Providing for the security
principles established in the NISTIR 7628 Guidelines allows the achievement of access control:15

Response is associated with detection and mitigation.
Detection ties into the Auditing component but also the
need to characterize normal behavior, i.e. should these
two systems be talking and at what rate. Unauthorized
traffic should not be utilizing bandwidth or reducing a
system’s availability. Ideally, the network system could
network flow information to detect malicious behavior
and react appropriately.

1.

Identity Management – In order to establish who
needs to or gets to talk, a method for establishing
identity is required

2.

Mutual Authentication – Once identity is established, both communication systems need to authenticate the identity of each other

3.

Authorization – Now that the systems have been authenticated, there needs to be a mechanism for determining the permissions for each system

4.

Auditing – Tracking pertinent events for troubleshooting system issues and for detecting unauthorized behavior is desired

5.

Confidentiality – A network is a shared medium and
needs to ensure the conversations between systems
are private, otherwise controlling access has little effect

6.

Integrity – A network needs to ensure the conversations between systems are not being altered or otherwise subverted in transit

System 1

7.

Availability – Systems need to be available when
they are expected to be available in order to provide
access

System 2

Principles 1 through 3 are concerned with securely and
confidently verifying the identity of both parties that
wish to communicate, thus ensuring that access is only
provided to the intended party. Principles 5 and 6 deal
with securely communicating in order to ensure that access is provided only to the intended party and that the
access provided is not being tampered with. This is typically provided by an encryption scheme.

Adaptability is a complicated issue. It includes the ability
to update the rules and potentially some of the software
infrastructure of a deployed system, upgrading hardware
and software for a new mission, and updating hardware
firmware after deployment. These are complicated issues
and beyond the scope of this paper, but are mentioned
briefly in the upcoming Supply Chain section.
Security Solutions
Networking the components of a space system enables
the use of terrestrial network security solutions for controlling access and negotiating communication. A network also provides a medium for auditing communication and events. Having a networked set of nodes means
that commercial, open-source, and industry best-practice
security solutions can be adapted for space systems. This
means additional layers of protection to a perimeter defense mechanism can be added.

Network
External
System

External
System

System 3

So how are these principles achieved? The security solutions for information technology (IT) access control are
very mature and the security concepts and solutions for
systems with similar constraints, like Smart Grids, are
rapidly maturing. Space systems engineers have a wealth
of tools from which to pull and adapt.

Unwanted Traffic

Desired Traffic
Should only be allowed to communicate with System 2
Should only be allowed to communicate with System 1 & 3

Figure 2: External Access Control Problem Example
Shirley
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External
System

Network

Network

Secured
System 1

Secured
System 2

Secured
System 2

External
System

Secured
System 1
Secured
System 3

Unsecured
System

External
System

Unauthorized Traffic

Unauthorized Traffic

Authorized Traffic

Authorized Traffic

Allowed to communicate with Secured System 3

Not allowed on Network

Allowed to communicate with Secured System 3

Not allowed to communicate with secured systems

Allowed to communicate with Secured System 1 & 2

Allowed to communicate with Secured System 1

Figure 4: Internal Access Control Example
Figure 3: External Access Control Example

There are two typical approaches for implementing an
access control solution:

One more piece to the puzzle needs to be added: in a networked system, it is important to track what transactions
are taking place, authorized and unauthorized. Figure 5
illustrates logging at a basic level. The same modules
used to control access to the system and network can relay transaction information to the Logger. These modules would need to be trusted completely or a framework
would need to be in place to determine the truth of a
module’s report. Another option would be to make the
Logger part of the network fabric so that all transaction
could be easily audited without any action from the end
systems.

Distributed – The ability to negotiate access lies
strictly within the network nodes

2.

Centralized – Access control is regulated by a central trusted authority

Both approaches have their merits; typically, the centralized approach will be the easiest to manage and will be
the most adaptable in the face of network system
changes.
Distributed Solutions

Establishing secure channels between the Logger and
networks systems ensures the accuracy of the audit. Securing a network at fundamental levels means controlling access to the system’s information and services
while providing an audit trail for the transactions that occur on that network. Therefore, a mechanism is needed
for identifying systems, authenticating systems, authorizing systems, auditing systems, communicating securely between systems, and ensuring the availability of
systems on a network.

A simple example of a strictly distributed access control
system would be discretionary access control (DAC). In
this approach, the system that produces the data or accepts input also controls what other systems can request
or supply it. This type of solution utilizes Access Control
Lists (ACLs) within each system. These ACLs are essentially whitelists that prescribe a set of systems that the
system will allow to communicate with itself. This alone
does not provide authentication nor does it entail a mechanism for protecting data or input in transit. Each ACL
system entry would need to contain secret information
about the system. This information could then be used to
authenticate the system and securely communicate with
it.

Solutions
The intention of the ideas expressed in this section is to
provide a starting point for realizing MONA as a secure
solution for space systems architecture. The key here is
to maintain as many MONA benefits as possible when
implementing an access control solution.

Shirley
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Secured
System 2

authenticate itself, allow said system to establish itself as
its claimed identity and, with the help of some other protocols, get access to the services on the network to which
it has the proper permissions. The KDC is able to achieve
this using symmetric key cryptography. Kerberos now
allows for the use of public key cryptography during certain phases of the authentication process.

Secured
System 3

Networked components in a space system could use an
authentication system like Kerberos to mutually authenticate themselves to each other and ultimately securely
communicate. Another benefit of this type of centralized
system is that the identity of who has sessions open with
whom is known; this means that resource utilization can
be tracked on a per system basis.

Network

Secured
System 1

Logger

Logging Traffic

What other industries are utilizing for the security of
their point-to-point systems as they transition them to
networked systems should also be researched. A prime
example of an industry that is undergoing this transition
is the energy industry with its grid environments. The
White House Networking and Information Technology
Research and Development (NITRD) Program and the
Department of Energy (DoE) developed a tailored trustworthy space (TTS) strategy for securing Smart Grids.
“A trustworthy space is an isolated collection of devices,
services, policies, and data that are meant to interact in a
secure, private, and reliable fashion. Tailored indicates
the need for handling the multiplicity of situations that
comprise an end-to-end system and a need to use design
patterns in different combinations to be able to mass customize appropriate solutions for the different circumstances common to the intelligent grid.”17

Figure 5: Network Logging Example
Assuming identity can be securely established and systems authenticated, DAC could, when coupled with an
auditing system, provide for the principles discussed. Issues arise when components are replaced, new components are added, or when granular access control is
needed. Adding new systems or replacing existing system means updating the ACLs of any systems that interacted with the replaced systems or that will interact with
the new systems. This can be cumbersome to manage
while building network in an offline state, but can prove
quite difficult if the network is deployed and would require special out-of-band handling. Secret management
is further complicated when system to service/interface
is not a one-to-one relation, i.e. a system has more than
one service or interface to which it must control access.

There are some differences between space systems and
intelligent grid systems that should be considered when
adopting this type of strategy. Another point to remember is that TTS is a strategy and not an actual implementation. McAffee’s, an Intel company, led a trail-blazing
effort called Security Fabric for an actual implementation of the TTS strategy. This implementation meets all
the security principles discussed so far, as well as a couple of others: identity management, authentication, access management, authorization, auditing, confidentiality, integrity, availability, non-reputability, and provenance.17 The system supports secure controller and device node interaction via a set of services and logging
capability as well some specialized hardware and software at the end systems. The concepts of TTS have applicability to space systems and Security Fabric shows
those concepts can be tailored to a specific application.
Undergoing a similar process for networked space systems would be a viable path forward to realizing secure
networked space systems.

In general, these are management problems where secrets must stored for each system or, if the systems needs
greater granularity, for each interface or service within a
system. This is a typical problem with a truly distributed
system, not just DAC. There still must be a way to update
access control policy and secrets, but it is difficult to do
this without a centralized management system.
Centralized Solutions
In a centralized solution, the network specifies and manages access from a central location. An example of
longstanding centralized authentication and authorization system is Kerberos.16 Kerberos utilizes a centralized
Key Distribution Center (KDC) that must be secure and
reliable since is poses a single point of failure. This issue
can be minimized using replication, but other security
provisions may be necessary to protect the overall functionality of the network. The Authentication Server (AS)
and the Ticket Granting Server (TGS) comprise the Key
Distribution Center. These two services, together with
secret information stored on the system that wishes to
Shirley
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Another critical security component to consider are the
integrity and confidentiality, or encryption, schemes or
protocols that are already designed for networks. An example of such a protocol is IPsec. IPsec allows for mutual authentication as well as session key negotiation. IPsec provides for a lot of the principles discussed. If coupled with other security components, it could also provide for auditing or provenance. IPsec can allow for secure communication between end systems, network to
end system or end system to end system.

Supply Chain
Identity and authentication have thus far been discussed
without relating what identity means, or how it might be
established and trusted. This points to a more systemic
issue of trust and ultimately provenance, or origin. So
much needs to be known about the hardware and software that will be used in space systems in order to ultimately trust the data that is being produced; this is not a
network-only challenge. System engineers, designers,
and procurement personal probably already pay a lot of
attention to this, but special consideration should be
made as components become more complex in capability
and sourcing. Multiple different manufacturers, designers, software firms, etc. will likely come together to produce a single COTS component and anyone in that chain
could introduce a security problem, intentionally or unintentionally, into the overall product. The supply chain
and testing procedures are as important as the security
measures that will be put in place to protect the networks.

Adding More Layers
Additional layers can be added to a security system by
introducing additional protection mechanisms. An example of this might be network segmentation; Figure 6
illustrates the concept of network segmentation. Network segmentation allows greater separation between
networked systems that should not be talking to each
other.

Maintaining OSA Principles
External
System

External
System

Secured
System 1

This paper has presented some of the information technology security solutions that might be tailored to the
specific needs of a space system; there are many more
that should be considered before deciding on the best solution. The best solution might ultimately be different,
depending on the usage scenario. It would be advantageous, and in line with OSA principles, for the space industry to develop a set of standardized security architectures and processes for ensuring that a system is secure.
The ongoing Space Universal Modular Architecture
(SUMO) effort should be followed as an example, as it
is trying to standardize and modularize all aspects of
space systems, security included, as an example for how
space security systems might be handled in an open systems architecture sort of way.

Secured
System 3

CONCLUSION

Secured
System 2
Subnet 1

Economic and technological factors are driving space
systems design towards OSA; MONA is a network centric OSA with which many developers are already familiar. MONA has all the benefits of OSA but also adds the
benefit of networked systems. Networked systems come
with a set of security challenges, but have been in place
for a long time and there is a wealth of security tools that
can be adapted to the special needs of networked space
systems. Other industries, such as the energy industry,
can be looked to for examples of how current network
security technology can be tailored to address the special
constraints of space systems.

Secured
System 4
Subnet 2

Network
Unauthorized Traffic
Authorized Traffic
Allowed to communicate on Subnet 1 with SS 1 & 2
Allowed to communicate on Subnet 1 with SS 1

Allowed to receive data from SS 1 & 2 on Subnet 2

Networked systems make sense from a cost standpoint
and with the right provisions in place, they will also
make sense from a security standpoint.

Subnets 1 & 2 cannot communicate

Figure 6: Network Segmentation Example
Shirley
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2014,
http://www.acq.osd.mil/se/initiatives/init_osa.html
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